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ABSTRACT
In 2007, Afghan grown poppies provided the raw material used to produce 93% of the world's opium. The Taliban and other insurgent elements receive up to $500 million of revenue from drug related activities. The current counternarcotics strategy emphasizes the execution of eradication programs coupled with initiatives designed to help farmers develop alternative livelihoods. Unfortunately, the current strategy does not provide any time after eradication effects for farmers to allow alternative livelihood initiatives to develop nor does the strategy address any schemes to deter key traffickers from disrupting counternarcotics efforts. This paper addresses the time problem of the current eradication/alternative livelihood counternarcotics strategy and proposes the creation of a microgrant supported poppy cultivation renouncement program. Finally, the paper suggests that as long as appropriate accountability measures exist, the hiring of key traffickers to help administer and monitor the program will turn a disruptive element into a potential influence of support for Afghan government and coalition efforts.
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A might receive close to $500 million of revenue from drug related activities. 5 A poppy cultivation renouncement program using monetary microgrants to incentivize farmers to abandon the poppy business and buying the support of key traffickers by enlisting their assistance in running the program will reduce the amount of opium produced.
History of Afghanistan Opium Production
Poppy and opium have long played a role in Afghanistan's economy, but only in the last 20 years has production increased to levels that today affect the entire world. In 1978 prior to the pro-Communist coup, Afghanistan produced 330 tons of opium, which was just enough to satisfy local demand and support a few opium production facilities. 6 In the 1980s, poppy cultivation began to rise resulting in a production of over 4900 tons in 1999 7 and nearly 4000 tons in 2000. 8 Also by 2000, Afghanistan was a significant player in the global opium market, accounting for nearly 75% of the world's supply. poppy harvest of 185 tons, a truly dramatic reduction from previous years. 13 The reduction did not last. When the Taliban banned poppy cultivation, they did not ban the opiate trade. Many experts believe the intent of the ban was to increase the opium market price in order to increase revenue from stockpiled opium supplies.
14 Therefore, once Taliban leaders fled Afghanistan, conditions were still in place for poppy growing to resume because all the tools of the drug trade remained intact. Poppy growing again increased resulting in a 2002 production of over 3,000 tons of opium.
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In the years following the removal of the Taliban from power, both the international community and Afghan government tried to rein in poppy cultivation. In 2002, Hamid Karzai, the new president of Afghanistan, officially prohibited the growing of opium poppy and declared a jihad against the drug industry. 16 19 Those 600 destroyed acres were less than 1% of the land used for poppy cultivation. 20 The results from 2006 eradication efforts were even more dismal as total poppy production increased 59% from 2005 to over 400,000 acres. 21 
Current Counternarcotics Strategy
The year 2006 saw the release and implementation of the current Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. 22 The strategy establishes eight pillars for eliminating the drug trade. The current eight pillars include: (1) a year round public information campaign to help the government of Afghanistan achieve sustainable reduction in poppy cultivation, (2) alternative development initiatives to establish economic alternatives to poppy cultivation, (3) elimination and eradication initiatives to deter and reduce poppy cultivation, (4) interdiction programs to decrease narcotics trafficking and processing, (5) law enforcement and justice reforms to improve narcotics-related police and justice sector efforts, (6) demand reduction initiatives to prevent and reduce Afghanistan's domestic drug abuse problem, (7) institution building programs to build up key ministries and other institutions involved in the fight against drugs, and (8) international and regional cooperation efforts to build counternarcotics support from Afghanistan's international neighbors. 23 Although all eight pillars receive attention, the strategy primarily focuses on the two pillars of eradication and alternative livelihood development.
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Current Counternarcotics Situation
The current Afghanistan counternarcotics strategy has seen some success. In 2008 the number of acres used for poppy cultivation decreased to 388,000 acres. 25 Additionally, the number of poppy free provinces increased 38% from 13 to 18. Afghanistan's opium. 27 Helmand province alone produces two-thirds of Afghanistan's poppy.
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Two primary factors account for the declining poppy harvests. One factor is strong leadership from some governors that discouraged poppy growing through anticultivation campaigns, peer pressure, and the promotion of rural development. The second factor is a significant drought in the north and north-west. 29 One important note regarding the decreased poppy production is that eradication efforts did not play a major effort in the production drop of 2007. In fact, there is evidence indicating that a strategy focused on eradication efforts does not reduce the size of a narcotics economy. 30 
Key Players in Drug Trade
Farmers and traffickers form the two main groups involved in the Afghan drug trade. The two groups have their own particular methods and motives explaining their involvement with opium. Understanding why each group continues to participate in the opium market is critical when evaluating the effectiveness of any potential change to the counternarcotics strategy.
For many farmers, poppy cultivation is the only viable means to reach goals of obtaining land, water, agriculture supplies, and credit. 31 Many farms experienced significant crop failure from 1998-2001 due to a nationwide drought. 32 In order to subsist, farmers had to borrow money. As large debt accumulated, farmers entered into repayment programs requiring continued poppy harvests to pay off the debt. Ironically, poppy eradication policies led to increased poppy growing. Once eradication occurred the farmers lost income potential, which meant more borrowing, more debt, and more poppy later. 33 A counternarcotics strategy has the potential for success if the strategy helps the farmers break out of the current continuous debt/payment cycle.
The traffickers who ship and distribute the refined opium products make up the second group of key players in the Afghan drug business. A successful counternarcotics strategy must account for disruption activities undertaken by traffickers to ensure a continued drug flow. Any change to the current counternarcotics strategy requires addressing the anticipated "pushback" from the traffickers as poppy production diminishes.
Poppy Cultivation Renouncement Program
Even though the 2008 counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan saw success in reducing the total amount of poppy grown, there is no indication that the current strategy will lead to future success. Since drought conditions contributed significantly to the reductions of 2008, there is no confidence that poppy cultivation reduction would continue if future years saw more rain. Now is the time to add a new element to the counternarcotics strategy to address a key fault in the current counternarcotics strategy.
The main effort of the current Afghan Drug Control Strategy attempts to simultaneously perform robust eradication programs and implement development assistance initiatives. 34 Administering simultaneous development assistance initiatives and eradication programs means farmers have no opportunity to build new livelihoods before losing the income previously earned from poppy cultivation.
Eradication efforts by their very nature are cold and antiseptic. In 2007, President
Karzai denied a United States government request to allow aerial spraying eradication operations. 35 To destroy poppy crops requires Afghan government or coalition forces to enter a farm, inform the occupants that illegal poppy is growing and then the forces manually destroy any poppy crops on the land. Farmers then have no options in regards to earning a living because the government does not provide compensation for the eradication since poppy growing is illegal.
Alternative livelihood efforts attempt to counter eradication efforts by offering farmers options other than growing poppy. These alternative livelihood initiatives have to take into account that Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. 36 The ability to find and develop natural resource opportunities is limited and manufacturing is Kandahar in the second year, which will add an additional 10% of the poppy producing population to the initiative. 40 Year three introduces the program to Helmand province, which alone accounts for 65% of Afghanistan's poppy. 41 In order to succeed, the Afghan government must administer the PCRP. Karzai's brother, participate in the drug trade. 43 What better way to turn these officials away from the drug business than by paying them to help manage a program designed to eliminate the poppy cultivation business?
To prevent the PCRP program from falling into neglect, recipients must reaffirm their renouncement pledge each planting season prior to receiving any further microgrant funds. If the program administrators do not require renouncement pledges followed by continued verification, then farmers will attempt to simultaneously receive microgrant funds and return to poppy cultivation.
Supporting the renouncement and verification aspects of the PCRP requires the enforcement of penalties against violators. In 2002 and 2003, the United Kingdom attempted to pay farmers not to plant poppy. However, the farmers pocketed funds and still produced opium because no penalties existed. 44 Instead, the recipients of the program received money and continued to grow poppy. The administrators of the program must be able to impose penalties within the rule of law.
Determining appropriate penalties is critical to the success of the program.
Penalties involving a range of potential punishments will confuse many farmers who are often illiterate or unfamiliar with many aspects of a judicial system. Additionally, penalties sending farmers to prison will not help build the image of the Afghan government as a supportive institution. Instead, the penalties should be easy to understand and based on a "quid pro quo" system. If farmers who receive a PCRP microgrant continue to grow poppy then the crop will receive immediate priority for 
Cost of Program
As the saying goes, "there is no such thing as a free lunch," and the PCRP is no exception. Implementing the program requires significant funding, but the overall benefits outweigh the costs. Estimating the size of the program budget requires addressing four cost factors: (1) identifying how many people will be part of the program, (2) the size of the microgrants, (3) the cost to gain support from the key traffickers, and (4) administrative costs.
To estimate costs requires understanding how many people will be part of the program. Because of large and extended families, it is difficult to determine exactly how many individuals participate in the poppy cultivation business. Therefore, the PCRP will focus its microgrant incentives towards families instead of individuals. In the 2008
Afghanistan Opium Survey, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that approximately 366,000 families from the seven PCRP targeted provinces were involved in the poppy cultivation business with Helmand province accounting for 66%
(or approximately 242,000) of the families. The total family population breakdown by province is as follows in Determining trafficker costs is a completely subjective endeavor but critically important to ensure program success. The farmers are but one target of the program.
Gaining support from the key traffickers is another required element of the program. If the key traffickers involved in the drug business do not receive some amount of replacement income for revenue lost from the opium business, then pressure will remain on farmers to continue growing poppy and the Afghan government is sure to receive resistance to the PCRP. Matching the money obligated for microgrants and using the additional money to pay traffickers to help operate the program and supervise program compliance will provide the needed incentive for the traffickers to support the Afghan government counternarcotics efforts.
Estimating PCRP administrative costs is also subjective in nature but looking at administrative costs of American charities provides a starting point. In order to educate and entice potential contributors, most charities report administrative costs. In 2008, Charity Navigator, a web-based charity evaluator, reported that on average American charities spent almost 10% of provided funding on administrative costs.
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Conservative approximations have to assume PCRP administrative costs will be significantly higher than U.S. charities. Government corruption, lack of technological advances, and the required large geographic scope of the PCRP are just three factors increasing the administrative costs of the program. Subjectively looking at the various cost factors leads to estimating administrative costs will equal 25% of the total microgrant and trafficker payment costs.
The next step after completing the cost factor analysis is to develop the program budget. The program gradually phases in over a three-year period. The first year only focuses on the five least violent poppy producing provinces (Farah, Uruzgan, Nimruz, Zabul, and Day-Kundi). The cost for the first year, to include microgrant costs and matching support costs, is $455 million. Year two incorporates Kandahar, which increases the costs to $620 million, and year three includes the addition of Helmand for an annual cost of $1.83 billion. Years four and five will include all seven provinces with no change in cost. In year six, the program starts to wind down as the initial five targeted provinces no longer receive program benefits and the cost will drop to $1.665
billion. In year seven of the program, the last year of the program, Kandahar will cease receiving money and only Helmand will receive benefits at a cost of $1.21 billion. The total cost of the program for the seven years is approximately $9.44 billion. Table 2 shows a year-by-year breakdown of the PCRP budget: No program can guarantee success but several specific factors support the assertion that the PCRP can thrive. The most important factor supporting success is that the PCRP does not require a new counternarcotics strategy. In fact, by its design the PCRP only bolsters and does not replace any aspect of the current strategy. As seen in 2008, the current strategy is showing limited success. 48 However, in those provinces with significant instability and a large Taliban influence, no incentive exists to encourage farmers to support the Afghan government instead of the Taliban. The PCRP will provide such an incentive and therefore provide an option for farmers to consider.
A second factor supporting success is that with poppy cultivation mainly confined to seven provinces, the PCRP can narrow its scope to only the poppy players in The first challenge to the program is that not every farmer in Afghanistan will receive benefits of the program, but by design, the program does not target all farmers.
The PCRP only targets populations in the seven main poppy producing provinces.
Farmers in the non-poppy growing provinces do not qualify for the program. So the question facing the administrators of the PCRP is how to prevent the development of a rift between the "haves and haves nots".
Since the PCRP is only part of the total counternarcotics strategy and not a separate campaign, the government of Afghanistan can prevent any rift development through continued aggressive application of the non-PCRP aspects of the counternarcotics strategy. Specifically, development in other provinces must continue in those areas with already reduced or eliminated poppy cultivation. Rewarding continued good behavior in non-poppy growing areas is essential to the success of the overall counternarcotics strategy. If such development does not continue, then the current nonpoppy growing provinces will potentially return to poppy harvesting in an attempt to reap PCRP benefits.
A way to reward continued good behavior is to direct other agricultural support programs towards those provinces not targeted by the PCRP. One particular program that will help reduce the "left out" feeling that some farmers may feel is a current National Guard program sending agricultural experts directly to the farmers. 51 The National Guard program has been successful in certain parts of the country and will provide a very beneficial complementary effort to the PCRP.
The PCRP has a high estimated price tag when compared to the amount of The fourth and potentially most difficult challenge is persuading the U.S.
government to accept what is essentially a "buy-off" program targeted at drug growers.
The current National Drug Control Strategy provides a rationale that could help garner U.S. government support for the PCRP. The National Drug Control Strategy works to reduce drug use in America through a balanced approach of stopping drug use before it starts, healing America's drug users, and disrupting the market for illegal drugs. 54 Focusing on the goal of disrupting the market for illegal drugs provides a potential avenue leading to U.S. acceptance of the PCRP.
The approach taken by the National Drug Control Strategy to disrupt the illegal drugs market is to attack "pressure points" in the drug trade. 55 These pressure points include targeting traffickers and users alike at the various points in the drug supply chain where the key players make decisions regarding production or movement that affect profit margins. The intent of the PCRP is to provide a temporary profit alternative for all the key players in the drug business. Paying both farmers and key non-farmer drug players not to participate in the drug business will break the profit margin pressure 
